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How Government Makes
Disasters More Disastrous, By Thomas A. Bowden
In
a speech from New Orleans last week, Republican presidential candidate
John McCain lashed out at the Bush administration for its response to
Hurricane Katrina. McCain's remarks, which appeared calculated to make
disaster relief a key campaign issue, revived harsh memories of the
savage storm that inundated the Mississippi Delta in late August 2005,
leaving more than 1,800 people dead and causing widespread property
damage.
Although
the floodwaters long ago receded, government officials are still
counting the disaster's costs. Earlier this year, the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers disclosed that 489,000 claimants are seeking damages
caused by poorly designed levees. Of those claimants, 247 want more
than $1 billion each, including one whopper for $3 quadrillion (a stack
of a quadrillion dollar coins would reach beyond Saturn).
The
tax dollars spent resolving those claims will augment the tens of
billions already paid to restore and repopulate New Orleans, a
below-sea-level bowl situated precariously amidst a lake, a major
river, and a gulf, in a known path for hurricanes.
Disasters
can sometimes shock a nation into questioning entrenched practices. But
Hurricane Katrina, perhaps the worst natural disaster ever to befall
America, has failed to spark serious challenge to long-standing
government policies that actively promote building and living in
disaster-prone areas.
The
Katrina tragedy should have called into question the so-called safety
net composed of government policies that actually encourage people to
embrace risks they would otherwise shun--to build in defiance of
historically obvious dangers, secure in the knowledge that innocent
others will be forced to share the costs when the worst happens.
Without
blaming the victims for having followed their own government's lead, it
is time to question whether those policies should continue.
The
first strands of today's safety net were spun in the nineteenth
century, as the Army Corps of Engineers shouldered the burden of
constructing and maintaining levees and other flood controls along the
Mississippi River. From then to now, Congress and the states have
responded to each new flood by installing newer, higher, and stronger
barriers at public expense, as if the preservation of a city like New
Orleans in its historical location were a self-evident necessity.
Throughout
the twentieth century, new strands were woven into the safety net,
first in the form of loans to disaster victims, then by direct grants,
infrastructure repairs, loan guarantees, job training, subsidized
investments, health care, debris removal, and a host of similar
rehabilitative measures.
In
1968, the National Flood Insurance Program began supplying subsidized
coverage for structures and their contents in flood-prone areas.
Similar state-subsidized insurance programs arose for hurricanes in
Florida and earthquakes in California. In 1978, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency was created to coordinate the increasingly complex
job of government disaster response.
At
each juncture, more aid was funneled to disaster victims without
serious challenge to the wisdom of encouraging people to occupy
vulnerable locations.
In
response to Mississippi floods, Florida hurricanes, and California
earthquakes, the number of major disaster declarations almost doubled
from the 1980s to the 1990s, from an annual average of 24 up to 46. At
century's end, Congress was paying an average of $3.7 billion a year in
supplemental disaster aid, with state taxpayers contributing many
millions more. As of August 2007, Katrina relief alone had cost federal
taxpayers $114 billion.
By
gradual steps, this disaster safety net became part of the legal
landscape, taken for granted by private investors and owners deciding
to undertake new projects or rebuild storm-damaged areas. Relief
programs--by minimizing, disguising, and shifting the real risks of
defying natural hazards--became an active force distorting private
decision-making and inviting even worse future tragedies.
Thus
if a pre-Katrina Mississippian asked himself, "Should I build my
house 10 feet above sea level, a quarter-mile from the Gulf
Coast?" the answer came back: "Sure, why not? The government
will look after me if disaster strikes."
This
entitlement mentality ensured that each new tragedy would generate
fresh demands to expand the safety net. In Katrina's aftermath, those
demands centered on State Farm, which dared to deny certain claims
under homeowners policies that covered wind damage but expressly
excluded floods. Mississippi's attorney general immediately sued to
void flood exclusion clauses as "unconscionable" and
"contrary to public policy" and even launched a criminal
investigation of State Farm's claims adjusting practices.
Last
year, a jury inflamed by adverse public opinion awarded $1 million in
punitive damages against State Farm for having stood on its contract
rights in a dispute involving a single house. That case was recently
reversed on appeal, but the victory is cold comfort for State Farm,
which in the meantime elected prudently to calm the litigation storm by
paying tens of millions of dollars to settle claims for unproven wind
damage. Voila! The safety net had a brand new strand, woven at the
insurance company's expense.
Disgusted,
State Farm announced last year that it would cease writing new
homeowners policies in Mississippi.
As
more private insurers withdraw from high-hazard areas--or raise their
rates to reflect the staggering legal and public relations costs of
offering disaster insurance--a predictable lament arises: the free
market has failed, and government must fill the vacuum so that the
statist safety net remains strong. Thus it surprises no one to hear
Florida Gov. Charlie Crist challenging this year's presidential
candidates to support creation of a federal catastrophic fund that
would keep insurance premiums artificially low in disaster-prone areas
across the country.
But
the solution is not more of the market distortions and perverse
incentives that have lured so many people into harm's way. The solution
is to replace the prevailing entitlement mentality with a free market
in disaster prevention, insurance, and recovery.
In
a free market--without tax-paid levees, government disaster relief, or
subsidized insurance--anyone who contemplates building or buying
property in a high-hazard area will need to face hard facts about the
local history of natural disasters, the efficacy and cost of preventive
measures, and the availability of insurance. . .
With
their own lives and wealth at stake, people will have every incentive
to evaluate risks objectively. And if hardy souls still choose to
occupy and fortify New Orleans, or build on an earthquake fault, or
live in a tornado alley, the risk and reward will be theirs alone. No
longer will government make disasters more disastrous by pretending
that citizens have a right to defy the forces of nature at others'
expense.
Thomas
A. Bowden is an analyst at the Ayn Rand Institute, focusing on legal
issues. Mr. Bowden is a former attorney and law school instructor who
practiced for twenty years in Baltimore, Maryland. The Ayn Rand
Institute promotes Objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand--author of
"Atlas Shrugged" and "The Fountainhead." Contact
the writer at media@aynrand.org.
To read
more, go to www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=17647.
Government health care
subsidies also create health care disasters.
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